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Topic: Law and Economics

NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies

Sarah E. Light | Article

The National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) information-disclosure requirements have the potential to create a quasi-carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions arising out of major federal actions. By requiring government polluters to expend more resources, both financial and political, on disclosure as project-related emissions increase, NEPA can operate like a carbon tax that forces agencies to internalize negative externalities associated with emissions.

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False Efficiency and Missed Opportunities in Law and Economics

Shawn J. Bayern Tul. L. Rev. Article
This Article points out a simple flaw common to many law-and-economics analyses, ranging from fundamental models like the Hand Formula to narrower arguments like those that oppose the doctrine of unconscionability. The flaw is straightforward: economic analyses of law often assume, either implicitly or explicitly, that when it is more efficient for an activity to occur than for it not to occur, it is efficient for legal rules to encourage the activity. Even on grounds of efficiency alone, however, knowing in isolation whether an activity produces more wealth than its absence is insufficient to conclude that the activity is efficient. [...]
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