Article by Patrick K. Hovet
States unhappy with the results of the 2020 election responded with a spate of voting restrictions. Among the most aggressive was the battleground state of Arizona, whose election laws were recently the subject of the 2021 Supreme Court case, Brnovich v. D.N.C. In that case, a majority of the Court found that a pair of Arizona voting restrictions did not violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The laws themselves placed a major burden on Native American voters by restricting modes of voting common in Native communities. The 6-3 ruling dismissed these burdens as minor by interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act very narrowly.
Brnovich dulled Section 2’s effectiveness at combating discriminatory election laws. Part II of this Comment offers a primer on the Voting Rights Act, the two causes of action for plaintiffs in voting rights suits, and the standards of review that courts apply to voting restrictions. Part III examines Native Americans’ vulnerability to voter suppression by dint of cultural differences and economic conditions in those communities. Part IV applies the relevant standards of review to two recently proposed voting restrictions that disparately impact Native Americans and demonstrates how, as a result of the social and historical context from which they emerged, those regulations violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
About the Author
Patrick K. Hovet, J.D. candidate 2023, Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2020, New York University. First, I want to thank Professor Stephen Griffin, who taught me everything I know about voting rights, and without whose “Law of Democracy” class this Comment would never have launched. Thank you to the members and staff of the Tulane Law Review for helping me along through the publication process, with a special thanks to Emily Shinn for her guidance and mentorship. Finally, a very special thank you to my family for their constant support.
Citation
97 Tul. L. Rev. 287