Case Note by Isabella Carrasco
As global companies increasingly rely on specialized foreign labor, the boundary between permissible hiring preferences and unlawful discrimination has become less clear. Purushothaman Rajaram, an information technology professional and naturalized U.S. citizen, applied multiple times to work at technology giant Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta) between 2020 and 2022 without success. He alleged that Meta's hiring practices favored noncitizens holding H-1B visas—whom the company could employ at relatively lower wages—thus discriminating against U.S. citizens. Rajaram filed a putative class action asserting that Meta's practices violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), which guarantees that all persons have the same right to make and enforce contracts as that enjoyed by white citizens.
Meta moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that “U.S. citizens are not a protected class under § 1981 and the plaintiff [had] not plausibly allege[d] intentional discrimination.” The United States District Court for the Northern District of California agreed and dismissed the complaint, holding that “a U.S. citizen cannot bring a claim for citizenship or alienage discrimination under § 1981.” On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that § 1981 does extend to claims of hiring discrimination against U.S. citizens based on their citizenship status.
Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, Inc. is significant because it marks the first time that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted § 1981 to encompass claims of reverse citizenship discrimination. In doing so, the court departed from the statute's underlying purpose and legislative history, opting instead for a strictly textual approach. This Case Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in treating § 1981's language as unambiguous and that a nuanced interpretation, one attentive to both the statute's Reconstruction-era origins and its modern interaction with employment discrimination law, would better align with established frameworks. Part II discusses § 1981's origins and its application to racial discrimination and provides an overview of pathways for citizenship discrimination claims. Part III discusses the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in finding § 1981 applicable to reverse citizenship discrimination. Part IV analyzes the implications of the court's strictly textual interpretation, and advocates for acknowledging the statute's inherent ambiguity. Part V briefly concludes.
About the Author
Isabella Carrasco, J.D. Candidate 2027, Tulane University Law School; B.A. 2024, Tulane University.
Citation
100 Tul. L. Rev. 1123