Constitutional Law—Fifth and Sixth Amendments—Definitions of "Custodial Interrogation" Under Miranda v. Arizona and of "Deliberate Elicitation" Under Massiah v. United States

Note by Peter Scott Julian

In the first of the noted cases, the defendant was arrested for armed robbery and murder, at which time he was advised of his Miranda rights by the arresting officers. After indicating his desire to speak to a lawyer, he was placed in a "caged wagon" with three officers and driven to the police station. While en route, the police officers engaged in a conversation regarding the necessity of an immediate search for the weapon due to the potential danger posed to children at a nearby school for the handicapped. The defendant interrupted the conversation and offered to show the officers where the gun was located. He then led the officers to the gun. A motion to suppress the evidence was denied by the trial judge, who ruled that the defendant had intelligently waived his right to remain silent. The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was invalid and set aside the conviction. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant had not been interrogated in violation of his right under Miranda to remain silent until he had spoken to an attorney. Accordingly, the Court did not reach the issue of a waiver of that right. The Court defined custodial interrogation as express questioning or its functional equivalent, and then defined the functional equivalent of express questioning as police words or actions which the police officers knew or should have known would elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Because the defendant had not been "interrogated" under the Court's test, admission of the weapon into evidence did not violate protections granted by the fifth amendment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).


About the Author

Peter Scott Julian.

Citation

56 Tul. L. Rev. 399 (1981)