Article by Earl M. Maltz
Recent scholarship reflects an increasing interest in the problem of statutory interpretation. In the past decade the problem has been analyzed from a variety of perspectives by some of the most prominent people in the academic community. Much of the literature is devoted to attacks on the traditional model of statutory interpretation—intentionalism—which uses the intent of the enacting legislature as the basis for judicial decisionmaking. Typically, these nonintentionalist commentators view the intentionalist methodology as a manifestation of a formalist approach to legal analysis and contend that some other mode of statutory interpretation more adequately fulfills the functions that adjudication should serve.
This Article takes a different view, suggesting that courts should apply a slightly modified form of the intentionalist model of statutory interpretation. To simplify and focus the inquiry, the Article will deal only with situations in which the courts are unconstrained by prior judicial or administrative precedent. It will not address the special problems created by federal constitutional constraints on judicial power. Part I will briefly describe the current approach that the United States Supreme Court takes toward the problem of statutory interpretation. Part II will argue that only a system based on intentionalism is consistent with basic premises of legislative supremacy. Parts III and IV will discuss the ambiguities inherent in intentionalist analysis and describe disciplining rules that should be adopted to modify the traditional model.
About the Author
Earl M. Maltz. Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).
Citation
63 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1988)