The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited

Article by Gary R. Roberts

In the early 1980s, four major law review articles were written challenging the holding in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League (Raiders II) that every internal governance rule or decision of a sports league automatically constituted a “contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy” of the individual member teams of the league within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act. I wrote two of these four articles, one in the UCLA Law Review and the other in the Tulane Law Review. A third article, in the Michigan Law Review, was written by Professor Myron Grauer. Professor John Weistart authored the fourth article in the Duke Law Journal. Although these four articles differed in some respects, the fundamental position advanced in each was that in most or all league governance cases, the league, not the individual club, is the relevant firm for purposes of antitrust analysis, and, therefore, league rules are not appropriately reviewed on a case-by-case rule of reason basis because the section 1 “plurality of actors” element is not satisfied.

For several years, these four articles, which took the position that leagues were generally single firms, were the only major scholarly efforts dealing with this issue. However, a recent article by Professor Lee Goldman in the Tulane Law Review has undertaken to defend the Raiders II view that each league member team is an independent firm for section 1 purposes. In so doing, Professor Goldman attempts to characterize and then to refute in order my, Professor Grauer's, and Professor Weistart's arguments. While Professor Goldman's effort is thorough and commendable—indeed, it is probably the best that can be done to support that particular view—it is nonetheless incorrect. This Article briefly attempts to explain why.

Professor Goldman's article represents the first effort by any commentator or court opposing single entity status for leagues to deal seriously with this complicated issue on any but the most superficial rhetorical level. Thus, although the rebuttal to his arguments might be gleaned by a very careful reading of the earlier articles noted above, a response directed specifically to his arguments will focus the debate. This is particularly true since Professor Goldman's article properly demonstrates that the debate essentially boils down to a single issue—whether league member clubs have any economic interests independent of the league. Thus, this issue needs to be explored thoroughly.


About the Author

Gary R. Roberts. Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. B.A. 1970, Bradley University; J.D. 1975, Stanford University.

Citation

64 Tul. L. Rev. 117 (1989)