Article by Linda Sandstrom Simard and William G. Young
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the common-law “general acceptance” test for admitting scientific opinion evidence did not survive the codification of federal evidentiary law in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court concluded that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, judges may admit expert testimony which is not yet generally accepted if it is reliable and relevant. Those commentators who see Daubert as inviting a vast expansion of opinion testimony in federal trials, however, are likely to be disappointed. The Daubert Court firmly established district court judges as “gatekeepers” of expert opinion testimony—charging them with the duty to determine whether such testimony is reliable enough to be admitted for the jury's consideration. A majority of the Supreme Court in Daubert then delineated criteria for determining the reliability of scientific testimony. However, the Court provided no guidance for determining the reliability of other types of expert testimony allowed by Rule 702.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is not self-explanatory, and any approach that depends on the district court judges acting as gatekeepers necessarily runs the risk of idiosyncratic approaches to admissibility. This risk is magnified by the complexity of the hypotheses on which a large portion of expert testimony rests. Thus, the future success of Rule 702 as an intelligible, evenly applied evidentiary standard depends on the cultivation of a common judicial understanding of its mandate and the development of a uniform methodology for analysis.
This Article embarks on that effort. Part II analyzes the special challenge faced by the trial judge in considering the admissibility of expert testimony. Part III discusses the impact of Daubert on the role of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702 or the Rule) in federal trials. Part IV considers the different types of knowledge embodied in the Rule and dissects the process of common-law codification to present a unified interpretation of the Rule that is sensitive to the specific nature of the underlying data. Part V suggests a theoretical approach to the crucial determination of reliability in instances in which the hypotheses offered may not be generally accepted. Uniform application of this approach to admissibility will have the beneficial effect of reducing disparity in evidentiary rulings and promoting predictability in the law, while accommodating new ideas and technologies that may assist a jury in the factfinding process.
About the Author
Linda Sandstrom Simard. Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.S., University of Delaware, 1986; J.D., Boston College, 1989.
William G. Young. United States District Judge, District of Massachusetts. A.B., Harvard University, 1962; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1967.
Citation
68 Tul. L. Rev. 1457 (1994)