Essay by Joachim Zekoll
The classic questions concerning comparative law are well known and easily stated: How does one define the discipline and what is its purpose? Numerous responses to these inquiries have helped to identify particular functions and methods that will accomplish certain research objectives. At least in this country, however, the theoretical and methodological foundations of comparative law are still less than fully developed. In a recent publication, William Ewald addressed this concern by denouncing contemporary comparative scholarship here and abroad as overly black-letter rule-oriented, insisting that the discipline will yield meaningful results only if it operates primarily as a philosophical enterprise. In this Essay, Professor Zekoll expresses disagreement with Ewald's criticism of current comparative scholarship and his proposal to reform the discipline. He argues that Ewald's effort to present a convincing critique fails because it lacks coherence and, in some instances, substance. Professor Zekoll concludes that Ewald's philosophical input and its application neither provide the innovation promised nor advance the understanding of foreign law.
About the Author
Joachim Zekoll. Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.
Citation
70 Tul. L. Rev. 2719 (1996)