Judicial Treatment of the Element of Materiality in Federal Criminal False Statement Statutes

Comment by Elizabeth Grace Livingston

Until 1995, courts routinely found an implied element of materiality in federal criminal false statement statutes. Courts also held that the element of materiality, whether express or implied, was properly determined by a judge. Through a series of recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has significantly changed the law regarding the element of materiality. In United States v. Gaudin, the Supreme Court ruled that materiality is a question for the jury. In United States v. Wells, the Court introduced a statute-by-statute analysis to determine whether a federal criminal false statement statute includes an implied element of materiality. Most recently, in United States v. Johnson, the Court found that reversal is not required when the element of materiality has been withheld from the jury. In their attempt to clarify the law of materiality, these decisions created an essential incongruity: the element of materiality itself is treated as immaterial.

This Comment considers the recent developments concerning the issue of materiality as an element of the offense in federal criminal false statement legislation. After Part II's brief consideration of the element of materiality, Part III gives an overview of the Supreme Court's treatment of the materiality element in the three most recent cases on the issue. Part IV examines the treatment of materiality when it is expressly included in a statute or judicially imposed, and particularly its determination and application in the latter instance. This examination is broken into three parts. The first considers when materiality is an element of the offense. The second considers the consequences of the presence of a materiality element. The third explores the remedial analyses and approaches available for errors under Gaudin, when the judge has withheld the element of materiality from the jury, including a discussion of the Johnson analysis. Finally, Part V suggests the danger of treating the element of materiality as immaterial.


About the Author

Elizabeth Grace Livingston. B.A. 1992, Connecticut College; M.A. 1994, Tulane University; J.D. candidate 1998, Tulane Law School.

Citation

72 Tul. L. Rev. 1343 (1998)