Recent Development by Wilson L. Maloz, III
John Papai injured his knee when he fell from a ladder while painting the tug Pt. Barrow, which was operated by Harbor Tug and Barge Company (Harbor Tug). Papai, however, was not an employee per se of Harbor Tug; he had been hired for only one day and was not going to sail with the Pt. Barrow once the painting was complete. Papai regularly secured short-term jobs such as this through the Inland Boatman's Union (IBU) hiring hall. Most of these assignments were for three days or fewer; consequently, because he received jobs through IBU during the two-and-a-quarter years prior to his injury, he worked on numerous vessels which were owned by several different companies. Most of the work performed by Papai during this period involved deckhand duties, although he also did maintenance and longshoring. It is notable, furthermore, that Papai had been employed by Harbor Tug on twelve separate occasions spanning the two-and-a-half months leading up to the accident on the Pt. Barrow.
Papai subsequently brought suit against Harbor Tug in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California claiming unseaworthiness under general maritime law and negligence under the Jones Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Harbor Tug on the ground that Papai was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act because he lacked the necessary permanent connection with the Pt. Barrow. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment as it did not make the proper inquiries in its determination of Papai's status as a seaman. The appeals court ruled that the proper test would be to analyze the “total circumstances” of Papai's employment. Under this scrutiny, the court determined that the group of employers who drew their labor from the IBU hiring hall should be treated as a single employer, thereby affording seaman status to maritime workers who perform seaman's duties under such a system, but who lack the required connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels because of the arrangements inherent in the system itself. The United States Supreme Court reversed this ruling and held that: (1) whether vessels are subject to common ownership or control determines whether there is an identifiable fleet for purposes of seaman status under the Jones Act; (2) the actual duties of a plaintiff on a vessel, not his classification under a union agreement, determines eligibility for seaman status; and (3) previous engagements with a single employer under such a hiring system are transitory and sporadic and therefore cannot qualify one for seaman status on a subsequent occasion. Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535 (1997).
About the Author
Wilson L. Maloz, III.
Citation
72 Tul. L. Rev. 2227 (1998)