Article by Charles E. Lugenbuhl and David B. Sharpe
The law of towage dates from the first half of the nineteenth century, when the development of steam power permitted the first self-propelled tug boats. But modern towage law is largely defined by three United States Supreme Court decisions handed down in the first half of the Twentieth Century: Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz (1927), which created the “flotilla rule” to determine when the value of a towed vessel should be included in a limitation of liability fund; Stevens v. The White City (1932), which held that the tug is not the bailee of the tow; and Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. (1955), which held that exculpatory clauses in towage contracts are void and unenforceable. A fourth Supreme Court case, Ryan v. Pan-Atlantic Corp. (1956), although not a towage case, has led some courts to engraft a warranty of workmanlike performance or service onto towage contracts. This Article examines and criticizes these four doctrines, and is intended to provoke a lively debate on how towage law in these areas could be improved in the next millennium.
About the Author
Charles E. Lugenbuhl; David B. Sharpe. Mr. Lugenbuhl and Mr. Sharpe are with the New Orleans law firm Lugenbuhl, Burke, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin & Hubbard. Mr. Lugenbuhl is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Tulane Law School, where he teaches a course on towage law, assisted by Mr. Sharpe, who joins the faculty in 2000 as an Adjunct Lecturer in Law.
Citation
73 Tul. L. Rev. 1811 (1999)