Article by Justin F. Marceau
The deference owed to state findings of fact under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, is hopelessly unclear. This Article identifies the two deference provisions, § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), and reviews their interaction, ultimately concluding that the treatment of (e)(1) as a superficial gloss on (d)(2) is misguided and undermines the purpose of collateral review of state convictions by federal courts. After addressing both the scope of review and standard of review problems, the Article concludes that the text, structure, and purpose of these provisions require a conclusion that only those state findings of fact that comport with minimum standards of procedural regularity should be afforded deference. Additionally, extrinsic evidence must be available for review by a federal court to permit a determination of whether a state's findings of fact may be rebutted.
About the Author
Justin F. Marceau. Assistant Public Defender in the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Public Defender, District of Arizona. B.A. 2000, Boston College; J.D. 2004, Harvard Law School.
Citation
82 Tul. L. Rev. 385 (2007)