Article by Philip A. Pucillo
A federal court of appeals ordinarily has no authority to entertain an appeal that is filed out of time. On occasion, however, the untimeliness of an appeal will result not from the appellant's carelessness or lack of familiarity with governing timing prescriptions, but instead from reasonable reliance upon a district court's representation that the appeal period would be lengthier than it turned out to be. To provide the courts of appeals with an equitable basis upon which to reach the merits of such an appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized what has come to be known as the “unique circumstances” doctrine.
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on the unique circumstances doctrine, however, have narrowed it almost completely out of existence. Even before abolishing the doctrine for appeals from civil actions, the Court generated significant confusion by imposing conditions for the doctrine's application that were both unduly demanding and inconsistent with its original understanding. The courts of appeals have thus been deprived of discretion to reach the merits of many appeals that would have fallen within the purview of the doctrine as originally conceived.
This Article urges that Congress reclaim legislatively the essence of the unique circumstances doctrine that the Supreme Court implemented judicially in Harris. Such a measure would involve an amendment to § 2107 codifying a formulation of the doctrine that comports with its original understanding. To derive that formulation, this Article examines Harris and the Court's other key decisions addressing the doctrine. The formulation ultimately reached is that in determining whether an appeal is timely, a court of appeals is bound to accept as true any representation of a district court upon which a litigant reasonably relies in foregoing an opportunity to initiate an indisputably timely appeal.
About the Author
Philip A. Pucillo. Associate Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A.B. 1992, Lafayette College; J.D. 1996, Tulane Law School.
Citation
82 Tul. L. Rev. 693 (2007)