Article by Jürgen Basedow
This Article begins with a review of the state of choice of law in the United States and Europe. It documents how the federal system in the United States has abandoned a significant role in choice of law through the doctrine of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., developed by the federal courts, and the congressional inaction that is reinforced by it. The substantially reduced role of the United States Constitution in choice of law after Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague is also documented. In contrast, European Community institutions, although coming to choice of law relatively late, have taken an active role in shaping the field. For example, by applying the basic freedoms, the European Court of Justice has occasioned significant changes to choice of law. The Article concludes that choice of law in federal systems requires balancing of the interests and policies of single states at the federal level. The Article submits that decisions of this kind are of a political nature and should therefore be taken by legislators at the federal or Union level.
About the Author
Jürgen Basedow. Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Jürgen Basedow. Director, Max Planck Institute of Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, and Professor of Law at the University of Hamburg, Germany. First State Exam 1974, Second State Exam 1978, Dr. jur. 1980, University of Hamburg; LL.M. 1981, Harvard Law School
Citation
82 Tul. L. Rev. 2119 (2008)