Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional Redundancy

Article by Alexandra D. Lahav

This Article presents the case for pluralism in litigation. Pluralism, in the form of jurisdictional redundancy, is embedded in our federalist system and our preference for adversarial adjudication. Judges and scholars should take more seriously the social benefits of multicentered litigation. These benefits include avoiding error, limiting the deleterious effects of private interests on the judicial system, and encouraging innovation. In furtherance of this goal, the Article proposes a three-factor test that judges and policy makers consider in determining the level of centralization appropriate in a given case: (1) the extent and nature of underlying substantive disagreement, (2) the costs of inconsistency, and (3) the role of political power in the litigation. The questions judges, legislators, and scholars should ask is not only how much pluralism our system of adjudication can tolerate, but also how much uniformity we should expect in a pluralist society.


About the Author

Alexandra D. Lahav. Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. 1993, Brown University; J.D. 1998, Harvard Law School.

Citation

82 Tul. L. Rev. 2369 (2008)