Panetti v. Davis: The Judicial Plunge Into the Dark Forest of Insanity and Death

Note by Oliver Atticus Kaufman

This note examines the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Panetti v. Davis, 863 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2017), where the court held that a petitioner must be granted appointed counsel and funds for expert assistance to prepare for a federal habeas petition under a theory of incompetency.

Context is King: Lawyer Dogs, Pure Applesauce, and Your Miranda Right to Counsel

Note by Christopher A. Hebert

This note examines the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari in State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d 1206 (La. 10/27/17). This Note analyzes the court’s decision denying a defendant his Miranda right to counsel based upon the defendant's choice of vocabulary. 

Juneau v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Hospitals—Killed by the Calendar: A Seemingly Unfair Result But a Correct Action

Note by Collin S. Buisson

This note explains and analyzes the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Juneau v. State ex rel. Department of Health and Hospitals, 2015-1382 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/7/16);197 So. 3d 398. The First Circuit held that the nieces and nephews of a personal injury claimant who died while his claim was still pending could not recover proceeds from his suit, since their mother—the claimant's sister—predeceased the claimant.

Courts Address the Finality Requirement To Determine Whether an Agency’s Action Is Ripe for Review

Note by Marjorie P. Dennard

This note explores the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Texas v. EEOC, 827 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2016), in which the Court held that the state of Texas had standing to challenge the EEOC's recent Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Vicarious Complaints and Normative Diversity: A Reply to Sage

Essay by Nicolas Cornell

In Third-Party Beneficiaries and the Nature of Contract, Nicholas W. Sage raised some concerns with the proposal for revising our understanding of contractual obligation championed by Nicolas Cornell's Article The Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain. In this reply, Cornell responds to Sage's response essay.

Intermediary Institutions and the Sharing Economy

Essay by John Infranca

In Regulating Sharing:  The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand challenges the assumption–implicit in the fast-growing legal literature on the “sharing economy”–that companies in this sector operate in the manner of traditional firms.  Framing the sharing economy as a “nascent form of a coordinated market economy,” Dyal-Chand calls for regulation rooted in a deeper understanding of the institutions–both the technological platforms most commonly associated with the sharing economy (Uber, Airbnb, TaskRabbit, and their ilk) and a burgeoning collection of more organic and democratic organizations—that shape this economy. This short Response focuses on the potential of this second category of institutions to achieve a more equitable distribution of the economic benefits of the sharing economy. 

The Tragedy of the Neutral Ground

Essay by Dave Fagundes

New Orleans’ Mardi Gras celebration is justifiably famous as a city-wide bacchanal centered on extravagant parades. But beneath the atmosphere of lawlessness, a surprising degree of order prevails that stops the gatherings from descending from revelry into chaos. This brief Essay explores the spoken and unspoken rules of New Orleans’ Carnival season, focusing on how both law and social norms combine to manage access to and use of the public property along the city’s major parade routes.

Third-Party Beneficiaries and the Nature of Contract

Essay Response by Nicholas Sage

In The Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain, Nicolas Cornell describes a jurisprudential puzzle concerning contract law’s treatment of third-party beneficiaries and contends that, to resolve the puzzle, we must radically revise our understanding of contractual obligation. This Response raises some difficulties for the revised understanding of contractual obligation that Cornell proposes.