Judgment as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages

Essay by Colleen P. Murphy

Under traditional doctrine, a court that considers a jury's award of damages to be excessive generally has two choices: order a new trial or offer a remittitur to the plaintiff, who may decline it in favor of a new trial. Federal courts of appeals are divided as to whether this traditional doctrine applies to excessive punitive awards, with some courts reducing such awards outright and entering judgment as a matter of law on the reduced amounts. After identifying the limited circumstances in which judgment as a matter of law is appropriate on awards of damages, the author argues that punitive damages fall within the general rule that a court may not reduce a jury award outright.


About the Author

Colleen P. Murphy. Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. J.D. 1986, Yale Law School; B.A. 1983, University of Virginia.

Citation

75 Tul. L. Rev. 459 (2000)