Comment by Stephen M. Gill
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to . . . Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” Nowhere in Article III do we find a party-based grant of federal jurisdiction in cases or controversies exclusively between aliens. However, in 1988, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Act amended the last part of § 1332(a) to read: “For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441, an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled.”
Several commentators have suggested that the amendment raises constitutional issues because, taken literally, it would permit a suit between a permanent resident alien, deemed a citizen of the state in which he or she is domiciled under the statute, and another alien. Under such a reading, the statute purports to grant subject matter jurisdiction in the lower federal courts beyond the scope of Article III, Section 2.
The purpose of this Comment is to address the constitutional concerns surrounding the permanent resident alien provision in the newly amended § 1332. Part II presents several hypothetical suits involving aliens and permanent resident aliens, to give the reader some background as to the problems with the permanent resident alien provision of § 1332(a). Part III examines the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to § 1332 to determine, if at all possible, Congress's “intent” in passing the amendments, and whether or not this imputed intent is helpful in determining the constitutionality and vitality of the permanent resident alien provision of § 1332(a) in various contexts. Part IV explores federal court treatment of the permanent resident alien provision by examining three recent decisions—Lloyds Bank PLC v. Norkin, Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, and Saadeh v. Farouki—to note the drastically different treatments various courts have given to both the provision itself and its legislative history. Part V is devoted to a normative analysis of how a federal court should proceed in examining the present provision should the issue arise. This Part first discusses two competing schools of statutory construction—intentionalism and textualism—to determine which theory is best suited to dealing with the permanent resident alien provision of § 1332(a). It then applies the two theories in constructing § 1332(a) in the context of a suit in federal court brought by a permanent resident alien against an alien and a U.S. citizen. Finally, Part VI makes some concluding remarks and suggestions for future treatment of this provision.
About the Author
Stephen M. Gill. J.D. candidate 2001, Tulane University School of Law; B.A. 1998, Louisiana State University.
Citation
75 Tul. L. Rev. 481 (2000)